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Is the Project (or Object) “nella testa dell’architetto?” 
Is There Anything “nella testa dell’architetto, soggetto, autore?” 
 
 
Before I elaborate on my title, let me thank Giovanni Durbiano and Alessandro Armando 
for their kind hospitality, as well as all the doctoral candidates, who I know quite well by now 
and with whom I find it a real pleasure to work – it is indeed they who are the true engine of 
Giovanni’s and Alessandro’s engagement. The great book Teoria del progetto architettonico 
that lies at the foundation of this seminar, which we should celebrate always anew, as well as 
a project of a small book about the project that we have yet to realize, are important elements 
in the context surrounding our meeting today. Let me also thank Pierre Caye and Karim 
Basbous who agreed to come for a joint workshop. I hope that we will all meet again in 
Belgrade (for which I would like to immediately propose the date of April 12th, when Joerg 
Gleiter will be visiting), but also in Rijeka, Dubrovnik, Paris, Berlin, etc. And I am particularly 
glad to have Snežana Vesnić with us here: her doctoral thesis, which is to be published in 
English soon, is on the concept, and was written at the same time as Giovanni and Alessandro 
were working on their book. It was Snežana who unearthed Pierre’s and Karim’s texts at the 
RIBA library and drew my attention to them. Karim’s idea of “Le project comme recherche” 
fits in well with the title of our seminar “L’innovazione del progetto” (or what Durbiano and 
Armando call “Il sapere prgettuale come disciplina”).1 It seems to me that this group is together 
capable to justify certain hypotheses or ideas found in our texts. In any case, we will shortly 
find out whether this group has a future. 
                                                 
1 A. Armando, G. Durbiano, Teoria del progetto architettonico, Roma, Carocci, 2017, 43. 
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Which is why I would like to give a few reasons that might justify meetings such as this 
in the future. And of course, I would also like to warn of some difficulties. Let us ignore for a 
moment the first and most obvious difficulty that I am not an architect – my mentor, Jacques 
Derrida was also fond of repeating this – in a room of mostly architects, designers, historians 
of architecture, experts on aesthetics, Karim’s thesis supervisor was Yves Hersant, he is friends 
with Maurizio Ferraris, we were all here a few years ago… The greatest difficulty is the 
confusion and chaos that pervades so-called “architectural terminology.” Followed by the 
possibility or uncertainty that in the future there will even be anything that could be called 
“architectural terminology,” which is to say, it is uncertain that we are compiling anything of 
the sort with these doctoral candidates. Along with this, the language we use, the language in 
which I am now reading this is problematic: there is no one in this room whose native language 
is English. We urgently need someone who speaks this language well; and I am not certain that 
we can discount this language too easily and return to our own mother tongues, however 
present they may remain. And of course, there is a problem with architects and designers 
(especially them!) having to speak or write at all (regardless of language). A month ago, for 
example, in Berlin, Peter Eisenman – who is in one way or another a close presence to all of 
us – uttered the following sentences: “I am not able to write what I think,” and then “I can teach 
concept, but not project,” which is something he cannot explain because, as he puts it, “project 
[is an] elusive term in English.”2 
Be that as it may. Here are three reasons why we should indeed continue working 
together. 1) The first is the defense of collective work, which necessarily implies the 
impossibility of existence of the project or design without group work and action (I would here 
like to insist that the concept is essentially a collective, cooperative entity3). The second reason 
refers to the great difficulties in translating various terms from one language to another. These 
difficulties are impossible to overcome without simultaneous use of multiple languages and 
thematizations of differences – it being a condition of revision of impossible linguistic 
                                                 
2 Over two years ago, in an interview entitled “On the End of Authority” (which has still to be 
published), he says: “That’s how you teach project – by reading and thinking in the design studio; you 
can’t just have a history-theory sequence” (Manuscript, 2).  
3 In this sense, young Corbusier’s language would be inexact when he writes in his famous letter of 22 
November 1908: “mon concept s’établit” and “mon concept de l’art,” 248. Although there might be 
some concept that is “only mine,” its thematization and manifestation unfolds with others and before 
others. It is similar with the idea of the project produced by a chief of a group or an idea that promotes 
one as the group chief (chef de bande, as Alexandre Kojève puts it). “Il l’est devenu (chef de bande) 
parce qu’il a vu plus loin que les autres, qu’il était seul à avoir conçu un projet, les autres n’ayant pas 
pu dépasser le niveau des données immédiates.” A. Kojève, La notion de l’autorité, Paris, Gallimard, 
74. 
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constructions and “theorems,” obscure and violent symmetries.4 And the final reason, 
particularly important for me since I have spent the last few years dealing with theory and 
philosophy of the institution, is what Eisenman (along with Derrida, to be sure) calls the 
“institutional aspect of architecture.” He speaks about this when writing about the critical 
dimension of architecture and about architecture as a social act.5 
A few months ago, when we held a joint seminar in Turin on the project, we attempted 
to provide a few of its elementary characteristics. One of them was that the project is 
necessarily an object. At the same time, a few of us were discussing the object in Belgrade 
(Snežana will today speak about the object in a similar context). And then in Berlin, in front of 
Eisenman and some others, I had to reconstruct how an object functioned in some of 
Eisenman’s texts. For all these reasons, the word ‘object’ appears in my title, along with the 
words ‘subject’ and ‘project’. The relations between these words are not my focus (at least not 
today); rather, I would like to situate the object as something that in person X’s head (as if this 
were a thing) ought to precede (or coincide) with the project, concept, design. More precisely, 
whether something that is ‘testa’, which it would seem is already material, or, shall we say, 
objective, can truly be the space for the object as a project, concept, design? What is this ‘as’ 
and how can we carefully connect the object with these three protocols? What is in someone’s 
head at all? What goes in and out of a head? My subtitle contains a few variations on words I 
have drawn from Durbiano and Armando’s book (“nella testa dell’architetto, soggetto, 
autore”6): their intention is to show that it is less important for architecture or epistemology of 
architecture whether something, if anything at all, is inside someone’s head. That is to say, 
their intention is not in their heads, and ‘intention’ as such is negligible in relation to facts, 
                                                 
4 I do not understand, or would not be able to explain a construction used, for example by Antoine Picon 
(“the project, an absent concept”) or Bernard Tschumi (“There is no architectural project without 
topographical, programmatic, budgetary, or political constraints. However, designing the Acropolis 
Museum involved perhaps the most unusual set of constraints imaginable. Constraints were the context 
of the project. Could these constraints be turned into a concept?”) B. Tschumi, Color Red, 495. 
5 In the manuscript of a big book entitled “Eisenmanual” (sitting in Eisenman’s studio because of 
problems with copyright), which collects all important aspects of Eisenman’s work, on page 236, we 
find: “Eisenman finds that a critical practice and discourse should dislocate the institutions of 
architecture from within, rather than celebrating them: the architectural discourse should not only create 
institutions, but also transform and dislocate them from within, and prevent architecture from being 
institutionalized.” 
6 “E la progettualità sono, molto prima che nella testa dell’architetto, nel’ambiente (fisico e sociale) che 
lo circonda.” A. Armando, G. Durbiano, Teoria del progetto architettonico, 15; “Il progetto ridotto a 
intenzione”: “Il progetto sembra essere rimasto rinchiuso nela testa di chi lo concepisce:il ‘maestro’, 
che detiene I segreti della forma, o l’’esperto’, che possiede la tecnica. (…) Intrappolato nella 
impenetrabile irriducibilità del soggetto, il progetto non è che un’intenzione. Priva di traccia.” Ibid., 33. 
Cf. Ibid., 40, 78. 
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documents or (social) objects, which are real, objective, and actually circulate among heads. 
The fact that there are two heads, and not one (as in my title), which is of course to say that, 
vice versa, two intentions, from two different heads, produce the social fact that someone’s 
head is not empty only when it shares its intentionality with another head or other heads. The 
condition for something to be a fact (or object) is indeed a ‘head’ in the plural, that is, multiple 
heads or intentions reduced to collective intention that constructs reality. This construction of 
reality or joint production of facts unfolds in processes or steps (temporal intervals) which 
could then be named using words such as concept, project, or design. In any case, these words 
(acts, protocols) should not even exist in the head as object. (How) is this even possible? 
To begin with, what is ‘epistemology of architecture’? It comprises at least three things: 
that architecture produces some specific knowledge, different to other knowledge; that the 
architect or (better) architects create concepts that can be classified and ordered (words such 
as design, concept, project, plan, idea, platform are different from one another, we should not 
be using them arbitrarily; architects must learn from one another and learn to read, to harmonize 
their experiences). Finally, it means that the language of architecture is possible as such, that 
it has its own discourse and genre. 
In a letter to Alessandro of September last year, Peter Eisenman writes: “I think my 
idea of bottega is different. For me bottega is in my head.” The atelier, the studio, the laboratory 
or boutique – since etymologically bottega is a place (un luogo) meant for storing sundry 
objects – is above all in the architect’s head.7  
What are these objects or object in the head? The title I gave to the Serbo-Croatian 
translation of Peter Eisenman’s collection of texts was “Idealni objekt arhitekture” [The Ideal 
Object of Architecture]. Lest we forget, “ideal object” or “ideality of the architectural object” 
is actually a paraphrase of the title of Derrida’s 1957 unwritten doctoral thesis, “The Ideality 
of the Literary Object” (l’idealité de l’objet litteraire) – and Eisenman’s text “Misreading 
Eisenman” contains the phrase “the object as ideal essence.” Indeed, a few years ago in 
Belgrade, he differentiated between “object as a mental construct” from “the actual object.” 
Derrida’s sentence from “Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry,” “the ideal object is 
the absolute model of the object in general” (l’objet idéal est le modèle absolu de l’objet en 
général), implies that this ideal is actually regulative and opposed to objects not purely 
intentional or objects that are intentional cum fundamento in re (a distinction I borrow from 
                                                 
7 Armando and Durbiano mention ‘bottega’ a lot in their book. The basic distinction between ‘bottega’ 
and ‘ufficio’ is that the first is a “luogo degli strumenti,” while the other is “luogo delle tecnologie 
intellettuali.” A. Armando, G. Durbiano, Teoria del progetto architettonico, 160. 
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Roman Ingarden), or opposed to ordinary physical objects (which Eisenman also calls “things 
in themselves”). Can the head then (the same head that also ‘ideally’ shares nothing with 
another head) contain an ideal fictitious object or a kind of mental construction? How could 
this be explained? And what would be the connection of ideality with the project, concept, 
design? We could also ask, “what should the head do,” and “what emerges from the head” or 
how distribution of various objects is conducted from the ‘bottega’. In a word, what is a project 
and how do we project, that is, design? We need another phenomenologist here to understand 
Peter Eisenman. Levinas’ book on intuition in Husserl contains the phrase “une structure ideal 
de l’objet” and it displays rather well the nature of the ideal. The head (Eisenman’s and other) 
does not contain objects (this would be nonsense), nor even the ideal or ideas (for this would 
be trivial as everyone has ideas, heads are brimming with ideas – such an explanation is 
insufficient). Rather, it contains the ‘ideal of the object as such’. The idea of something that 
has physical presence is precisely the conceptual or the concept. In his famous text on 
conceptual architecture, Eisenman finds that “the idea within the thing itself” to be synonymous 
with the “conceptual structure” of the thing itself, and finally that “physical reality itself does 
have a conceptual aspect.” 
What is the novelty here? Projecting (to project is to throw something forth, in front of 
oneself) is not projecting/designing an object (one does not throw forward an object). The 
object is, rather, discovered, revealed, selected, exposed, presented before (vis-à-vis; 
Gegenstand) by way of concept. In that sense, the project is a projection of the concept that is 
always the concept of the object (the ‘ideal of the object as such’). The task of architecture is 
to reveal the concepts of physical things and realize objects in time (only at this point do the 
twin protocols of process and design appear).  If we reconstruct the connection between project 
and object in the context of Eisenman’s reflections on conceptual architecture, we can say that 
“having a project” (Eisenman’s mantra in the last few years; as only a small number of 
architects “have a project”) means being able to objectivize the concept or the ‘ideal of the 
object as such’. 
Not only should the uncertain origin of these two positions – that there is something in 
a head and, conversely, that there is nothing in head, but that everything takes place as a product 
of coordination and joint cooperation of multiple heads – be examined and reconstructed in 
detail, but it would also be useful to uncover the option in which they are complementary, 
forming something new. What does Eisenman mean by pushing a kind of sophisticated pseudo-
Platonism? In my head there are no ideal forms that in absorbing the world, subjugate and alter 
it, bringing it closer to the ideal. Rather (since we are ignorant indeed of the nature of this 
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power and the nature of the abilities of this ‘head’), there is an ability to subsume these objects 
such that they, ‘on their own’, find their ideal structures (concepts) in the human spirit. 
 How this is possible needs to be verified and then harmonized with various texts that 
hint at and ground the ‘interior’ or the ‘myth of the interior’ of (having something in) ‘the 
head’. How is it possible to perceive the object as such? How is it possible to constitute an 
ideal structure of the perceived object? How is it possible to project a concept (an ideal 
structure)? What is the role of design in this process? 
 
Alberti, praescribere in animo et mente (Pierre Caye) 1452 
 
Antonio Filarete Concepto 1464  
 
“De suerte que se puede definir el concepto: es un acto del entendimiento, que exprime 
la correspondencia que se halla entre los objetos.” The concept is a mental act which expresses 
the correspondence between two things. 
Baltasar Gracián, “Agudeza y arte de ingenio,” Discurso II 1648, in: Obras completas, 
tomo II, Turner, Madrid, 1993, 320. 
 
Defoe « faculty of projecting » 1692 
 
Christian Wolff, Deutsche Logik, Von den Begriffen der Dinge, 1713 
 
« Qu'est-ce que l'architecture ? La définirai-je, avec Vitruve, l'art de bâtir ? Non. Il y a 
dans cette définition une erreur grossière. Vitruve prend l'effet pour la cause. Il faut concevoir 
pour effectuer. Nos premiers pères n'ont bâti leurs cabanes qu'après en avoir conçu l'image. 
C'est cette production de l'esprit, c'est cette création qui cons […]  Boullée, Etienne-Louis 1780 
 
Schopenhauer  Die Vernunft ist weibliche Natur; das Objekt und Maennliche1819  
 
E. Husserl Ideen 1907 Intentio 
Let us consider a familiar example. A band of kids gather to play. One of these kids proposes 
to go and steal apples from the orchard next door. Immediately, by doing so, he casts himself 
in the role of the band’s leader. He became this leader because he saw further (plus loin) than 
the others, because it was he alone who thought out a project, while the others did not manage 
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to get beyond the level of immediate facts.” A. Kojève, The Notion of Authority, London, Verso, 
2014, 63; A. Kojève, La notion de l’Autorité, Paris, Gallimard, 2004, 74.   1942 
 
Bertrand de Jouvenel dessin dénote une image formée dans esprit 1964  
 
Paul Virilio Images mentales 1981 
 
